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IN THE SUPP~ME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. CASE NO. 16802 
MARY PIERREN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND CROSS-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by the State of Utah against 
the defendant to recover public assistance payments fraudulently 
obtained by the defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff filed its complaint against defendant on 
September 14, 1978, alleging that defendant had fraudulently 
obtained $4,080.00 in public assistance which she was not 
entitled to receive. The hearing on this matter was before 
the Honorable Judge Calvin Gould on the 11th, 12th, and 26th 
of September, 1979. Judge Gould ruled that the public 
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assistance payments made by plaintiff to defendant were induced 
by defendant's fraudulent misrepresentations regarding material 
matters which plaintiff relied on; namely, the defendant failed 
to report that her ex-husband Pierre Pierren was living in the 
home. (R.48). From this ruling, Judge Gould granted judgment 
in favor of the plaintiff for $3,066.00 of the contested 
$4,080.00. (R.49). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent asks this court for an aff irmance of the 
lower court's decision regarding defendant's fraud in obtaining 
public assistance. In addition, respondent urges this court 
to grant respondent a judgment of $4, 080. 00 instead of $3, 066.0~ 
granted by the lower court. 
STATEMENT QF THE FACTS 
In this case, the evidence admitted during the trial 
regarding defendant's public assistance records and her divorce 
decree was not made part of the appellate record. As a result, 
defendant placed this evidence in the back of her brief for 
the Court's reference. To avoid duplication, respondent will 
also refer to the appendices in the back of defendant's brief. 
In April 1976 defendant applied for public assistance 
and food stamps from the State of Utah. On her assistance 
application, defendant named only herself and her four children 
as members of the household. {Appendix A of defendant's brief) 
Defendant listed her husband, Pierre Pierren, as being absent 
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from the home for the last 10 months. (Appendix A) . Defendant 
also signed her application with the understanding that she was 
to notify the Assistance Payments Administration (APA) office 
regarding any changes in the makeup of her household. (Appendix 
A, last page) . 
On September 21, 1976, defendant reapplied for assistance 
and food stamps, and again listed only herself and her children 
as members of the household. (Appendix B) . The question regarding 
a man in the home, was deliberately left blank by the defendant. 
(R. 259,260). On March 7, 1977, a similar reapplication for 
assistance and food stamps was executed by the defendant, and once 
again defendant named only herself and children as members of the 
household. (Appendix C). 
On July 16, 1976, Pierre and Mary Pierren entered the 
office of the Brigadoon Apartments together; and had a rental 
agreement signed in Pierre's name listing Pierre and Mary Pierren 
as tenants of the same apartment. (R. 113, 114, 153, 176). 
From July 16, 1976, to May of 1977, tenants and employees of the 
Brigadoon Apartments were of the opinion that Mary and Pierre lived 
together. (R. 118, 119, 135, 144, 157). Their opinions were 
based on the following facts and observations; (1) Pierre was 
seen on a daily basis around and about the apartment (R. 114, 124, 
132, 141, 154). (2) Pierre was observed in the apartment 
during all times of the day. (R. 124, 132, 144, 145, 157). 
(3) Pierre would pay the rent of the apartment with checks 
made payable to him. (R. 116). (4) Pierre and Mary would often 
play cards and have parties at their apartment with other 
-3-
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tenants_ of the Brigadoon Apartments (R. 132, 133, 143). 
(5) Mary told. two of the tenants of the Brigadoon Apartments, 
that "if anybody from Welfare comes around, don't tell them 
that we are living together." {R. 134, 144). 
In fact, such a substantial amount of testimony and 
evidence was presented during the trial showing that Pierre 
and Mary lived together; Judge Gould was impressed to make the 
following remark: 
"But it is hard for me to see, Mr .. Dazey, how, 
without having investigators actually walk through 
the bedroom how the State could put in a case very 
much stronger than this on that point." (R. 270). 
Once it was established Pierre lived with Mary, the 
unrefuted testimony of Victor Larsen showed that defendant woula 
have been ineligible for financial assistance had the truth been 
known. (R. 171). Therefore, Judge Gould ruled that the 
defendant was ineligible for financial assistance payments 
from August, 1976 to May, 1977. (R. 46)~ 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ERR WHEN HE ·HELD THE STATE 
HAD PROVEN ITS BURDEN BY CLEAR Al~D CONVINCING 
EVIDENCE THAT PIERRE PIERREN WAS LIVING IN DEFENDANT'S 
HOUSEHOLD. 
In the present case, one matter needs to be made 
emphasized; the defendant would not have been eligible for Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children {AFDC) if she would have 
listed Pierre Pierren a member of her household. {R. 171). 
Since the information was withheld, she received AFDC 
assistance to which she was not entitled. 
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At this point it is important to distinguish between 
the various types of public assistance programs. There are 
three distinctive programs: (R. 271-273). 
1. Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
2. Aid to Families with Dependent Children -
Unemployed Parents (AFDC-U) . 
3. General Assistance (GA) 
The eligibility requirements for each type of assistance 
are different and the "income and resource" classifications are 
also different. The defendant, Mary Pierren, applied for and 
received AFDC benefits. It is not the duty of this court to 
make a determination that she was eligible for any other type 
of assistance than that for which she applied. For example: 
to be eligible for AFDC-U or GA, the defendant would have had to 
report on her application that her ex-husband, Pierre Pierren, was 
a member of her household. In addition, to maintain eligibility 
for the AFDC-U or GA programs, the defendant's ex-husband would 
have had to enroll in various work projects. Since Pierre's 
presence in defendant's household was unreported, defendant's 
eligibility for assistance can only be determined under the 
specific criterion she applied, AFDC. 
In determining if defendant's children were eligible 
for AFDC, it must first be considered whether the children were 
"dependent" within the meaning of the Social Security Act 
§406(a), 42 U.S.C.A. §606(a). The Social Security Act defines 
a dependent child as a "needy child . who has been deprived 
of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued 
~--~ ~h~ hnme, or physical or mental incapacity of a Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
parent. . . " 4 2 U ~ S. C. A. § 6 O 6 (a) . 
In the present case defendant contends that her childre 
were eligible for AFDC because (1) Pierre was continually abseru 
from the home, or ( 2) even if he wasn't, the children were still 
needy because Pierre did not furnish any support. In answer 
to ?.e:Eendant' s second argument the lan<!mark decision of King v. 
Smith, 392 U.S. 309, · (1968) should be controlling. 
In King v. Smith, the United States Supreme Court 
analyzes the history of the AFDC program and states the followi 
reasons for the program's enactment: 
"The AFDC program was designed to meet a 
need unmet by programs providing employment for 
breadwinners. It was designed to protect what the 
House Report characterized as '[o]ne clearly 
distinguishable group of children.' H.R. Rep. No. 
615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1935). This group 
was composed of children in families without a 
breadwinner,' 'wage earner,' or 'father,' as the 
repeated use of these terms throughout the Report 
of the President's Committee, Committee Hearings 
and Reports ~nd the floor debates make perfectly 
clear. To describe the sort of breadwinner that it 
had in mind, Congress employed the word 'parent.' 
49 Stat. 629, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §606(a). A 
child would be eligible for assistance if his parent 
was deceased, incapacitated or continually absent." 
King v. Smith, 392, U.S. at 328. In otherwords, AFDC was not 
set up to take care of all needy children but only those needy 
children who are deprived of their parent because he is dead, 
incapacitated or continually absent. See Graham v. Shaffer, li 
Ariz. App. 497, 498 P.2d 571 (1972). Thus, the issue of wheth 
or not the parent furnishes support is not a determinative 
factor. In fact, this point is substantiated by the following 
statement in King v. Smith, supra, 
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"The State correctly observes that the fact 
that the man in question does not actually support 
the child cannot be determinative, because a natural 
father at home may fail actually to support his 
child but his presence will still render the child 
ineligible for assistance." 392 U.S. at 329 (Emphasis 
added) . 
In King v. Smith, (the controlling U.S. Supreme Court 
case on AFDC matters) all that is needed to render defendant's 
household ineligible for AFDC is the presence of Pierre in the 
home. Since Pierre was in the home, defendant's household was 
ineligible, regardless of whether or not Pierre furnished the 
children support. 
An example of one of the cases following the King v. 
Smith rationaleis Trull v. District of Columbia Dept. of Public 
Welfare, 268 A.2d 859 (D.C. 1970). In Trull the father forced 
himself into the home over the objections of his wife. The 
father remained in the home and did not work on the outside, 
even though he was able-bodied and employable. In upholding a 
determination of ineligibility for AFDC, the Court stated that 
there must be both a need and deprivation, i.e., the child must 
be deprived of "the support of at least one parent by reason 
of the parent's death, incapcity or continued absence from the 
home." Trull 268 A.2d at 860. The fact that Mr. Trull was 
living in the home (in other words he was not "absent from" the home) 
was sufficient. It was immaterial that he was unemployed and 
did not contribute support. The court concluded its decision by 
stating that the children would remain ineligible until their father 
left home. 
Since Pierre's non-support or support of the children 
~ ------~ing defendant's eligibility for AFDC; the 
_...,_ 
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only remaining contention by defendant that her household 
was eligible is that Pierre was continually absent from the 
home. In Smith v. Hueker, 531 F.2d 1355 (6 C.C.A. 1976) 
the Court points out that the federal legislation does not defb 
the term "continued absence." However, the term "continued 
absence" is mentioned in the federal regulation, 45 C.F.R. 
§233.90 (c) (1) (iii), which states, 
"Continued absence of the parent from 
the home constitutes the reason for deprivation 
of parental support or care when the parent is 
out of the home, the nature of the absence is such 
as either to interrupt or to terminate the parent's 
functioning as a provider of maintenance, physical 
care, or guidance for the child, and the known or 
indefinite duration of the absence precludes counting 
on the parent's performance of his function in planning
1 for the present support or care of the child. If these 
conditions exist, the parent may have left only recen~ 
or some time previously." 
The Utah regulation for deprivation of support (APA Reg. 
Vol. II §224) basically states this same definition. Thus, 
the definition of "continued absence" from the above regulation 
shows that if the parent is not out of the home, then all of 
the conditions do not exist for the parent to come under the 
definition of continually absent. 
To understand the definition of "continued absence " 
better, it is beneficial to analyze the parts of the definiti~ 
The following example which breaks down the parts of the defini 
of continued absence is helpful. Example: For a parent to be 
considered continually absent from the home the parent must 
meet all of the conditions below: 
-8-
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(1) The parent must be out of the home. 
(2) The parent's absence interrupt's or terminates 
the parent's functioning as a provider of 
maintenance, physical care, or guidance for 
the child, and 
(3) The known or indefinite duration of the absence 
precludes counting on the parent's performance 
of his function in planning for the present support 
or care of the child. 
In the present case the first element.of the definition for 
continued absence was never met because Pierre was in the home. 
Thus, the other element of the definition dcesnot need to be 
considered because the failure to meet the first element rendered 
defendant's household ineligible for AFDC. 
In the cases cited in defendant's first point, she has 
confused the present case by showing how some courts grappled 
with the second and third elements of the "continued absence" 
definition. This court does not need to concern itself with the 
second and third elements, because Pierre did not meet the 
condition set forth in the first element. Pierre was not away 
from the home! 
An example of how defendant's first point in her brief 
is confusing, is illustrated in the case of Freeman v. Lukard, 
465 F. Supp. 1269 (D.C.E.D. Va., Richmond Div., 1979). In 
Freeman the children were found ineligible .for AFDC benefits 
because the father did not meet the second element of the 
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"contin_ued absent" defintion. The first element {absence from 
the home) was met by the father and was stated as an undisputed 
fact. The following comments by the Freeman court substantiati 
this; 
"The undisputed facts are as follows." 
" ... although the father was absent from the 
home he continued to visit the younger children 
daily, discuss their care with the plaintiff, and 
provide them with milk and diapers." 
Freeman 465 F. Supp. at 1271. 
The above statement shows that the Freeman court 
was not concerned about whether the father was in the home 
or away from the home, that element was already well established 
by the undisputed facts. What the court in Freeman used to reno' 
the defendant ineligible for AFDC, was the finding that the fatl 
had not met the second element of the ''continued absent" definiti 
Since Pierre does not fit in the "continued absent" 
definition unless he is out of the home, the next question that 
needs to be answered in this case, is what is meant by being o~ 
the home, or in other words being in the home. One can if he 
-wishes cite several cases which define "living together" or 
'living with", however, this court should keep in mind that those 
terms are not words of art. For example, the defendant cites 
the case of Johnson v. Finch, 350 F. Supp. ·945 {D. Tex. 1972), 
and concludes that the same analysis of that decision should 
apply to the case at bar. The court should compare the wording 
in the case of bemaray v. Mannerud Const. Co., 128 N.W. 2d S51 
{S.D. 1964), wherein construing Workmen's Compensation Regulati 
the court concluded that "living with" does not impart dwelling 
together and that the wife could be st 
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be deemed "living with" her husband. Respondent's argument 
is that the principle of stare decisis should not be applied 
to rule that the defendant's ex-husband did or did not "live in" or 
"was or was not absent from the home" her home. This case must 
be decided upon its own facts and circumstances. 
The defendant cites several cases in Point I of her 
brief, and states for each case the reasons why the court concluded 
that the father of the children was in the home. This case 
should also be examined in the same fashion. When the facts and 
testimonies of this case were scrutinized closely at the trial 
it was clear to the court that the State met its burden and showed 
by clear and convincing evidence that Pierre was in the home. 
(R. 270). 
A case showing that the evidence in the present case is 
sufficient to prove fraud is Beech v. State, 319 N.E. 2d 678 
(Ind. 1974). In Beec~, the defendant argued that her alcoholic 
husband, was absent from the home. However, several neighbors 
of the defendant testified that they saw Mr. and Mrs. Beech often 
together, at all times of the day. With the testimonies of the 
neighbors and a welfare investigator, a lower court in Indiana 
found that Mr. Beech was not absent from the home under a 
criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, it 
is interesting to note that Mrs. Beech was convicted without 
the State having to prove that Mr. and Mrs. Beech maintained 
conjugal relationships or that Mr. Beech ever spent the night 
with the defendant. On appeal Mrs. Beech's conviction was affirmed. 
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The facts in this case are very similar to Beech, howev1 
the present ca~e did not require a standard of beyond a reason~ 
doubt for Judge Gould to rule in the State's favor. The presen1 
case only required a standard of clear and convincing evidence. 
This standard was clearly met by the State when four witnesses 
who were personal friends of the defendant testified that Piern 
was at defendant's home almost every day, at all times of the~ 
(R.114, 124, 132, 141, 144, 154, 157, 203). The witnesses also 
testified that Mary and Pierre never gave any indication that ti 
were separated or divorced. In fact, Pierre and Mary were so 
concerned that the neighbors across the hall knew they were livi. 
together that they specifically requested them not to tell the . 
welfare man. (R. 134, 144). The neighbors interpreted this 
statement to mean that the defendant was getting money she knew s· 
was not entitled to receive. (R. 137, 138, 144). Therefore, ~ 
present case Judge Gould did not err when he held defendant's~ 
husbandwas not absent from the home. ( R. 4 5 , 4 6) • Other eviden 
substantiating Pierre being in the home is contained in the 
·statement of facts. Other evidence is too numerous to list. 
Point II 
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S FINDING DID NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANT'S 
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BECAUSE NO CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION 
WAS MADE WITH RESPECT TO PIERRE PIERREN FURNISHING 
MAINTENANCE, PHYSICAL CARE OR GUIDANCE TO HIS CHILDREN· 
In Point I of the argument, it was pointed out that 
the ~sue before ~he lower court was whether or not Pierre was 
present in defendant's household. The finding by Judge Gould 
that Pierre was in defendant's household, was enough in and of 
-12-
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itself to render defendant ineligible for AFDC. Thus, 
whether or not Pierre provided support to his children 
did not need to be determined and was irrelevant to this 
case. 
The defendant in this case seems to have the same 
"fundamental misconception" about AFDC as did the defendant 
in Shannon v. Department of Human Services, 157 N.J. Sup. 
251, 384 A.2d 899 (Super. Ct. N.J., App. Div. 1976). In 
that case -the irrebuttable presumption argument was also 
raised. The court stated the argument lacked merit giving 
the following explanation; 
Appellant raises several substantive 
points of argument, all of which, in our 
view, lack merit. First, appellant contends 
that the agency's interpretation of the term 
"continued absence" as excluding frequent 
visition by a purportedly "absent" parent 
raised an irrebuttable and improper pre-
sumption that the child is being supported 
by the visiting parent. In making this ar-
gument appellant discloses a fundamental 
misconception concerning the purpose and 
scooe of the federally-funded AFDC assist-
ance program. Although the financial need. 
of a child is an essential condition to eligi-
bility under the program, need alone is in-
sufficient. The protection afforded by the 
AFDC program extends to children who are 
found to be in need of financial assistance 
and who, while living in New Jersey, have 
"been deprived of parental support or care 
by reason of the death, continued absence 
from the home, or physical or mental inca-
pacity of a parent." N.J.S.A. 44:10-l(c). 
Hence, the program was designed to protect 
a clearly distinguishable group of children 
in need of financial assistance, those lacking 
a parent through death, physical or mental 
incapacity or continued absence. See King 
v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 
L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968). This limitation on those 
eligible for benefits thereunder is empha-
sized by the deletion in N.J.S.A. 44:10-
, ")_ 
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l(c) (1) of a provision extending protection to 
a child living with both parents where the 
father is unemployed or the earnings of both 
parents are insufficient.* [*Refers to New Jersey's 
AFDC-U program] 
Clearly under the law pertinent to the present 
controversy, eligibility for benefits was deter-
mined not only by financial need but by the absence 
of a parent whether by reason of death, incapacity 
or continued absence, this latter condition inde-
pendent of financial support being needed or provided. 
(Brackets; Footnote reference, Emphasis Added). 
Shannon, 384 A.2d at 900,901. 
Since, defendant applied for AFDC assistance and not 
AFDC-U, the only concern before this court is whether or not 
the evidence supports the conclusion that Pierre was in defend~ 
household. Thus, the conclusive presumption argument raised by 
defendant is irrelevant to this case. 
Point III 
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT CONTESTING THE AFDC REGULATIONS 
AS VAGUE, WAS NOT RAISED IN THE PLEADINGS NOR PUT IN 
ISSUE AT THE TRIAL AND CANNOT BE CONSIDERED FOR THE 
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
The third point in defendant's brief is now being pres~ 
·to this court for the first time on appeal. This issue was n~ 
put in issue in any form through pleadings, motion, or at trial. 
This argument is therefore improperly before this court and is 
not to be considered. The Utah Supreme Court has stated over 
the years that: "matters neither raised in the pleadings norp 
in issue at trial cannot be considered for the first time on 
appeal." Wagner v. Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 366, 482 P.2d 702, 704 
(1971). See also, Park City Utah Corp. Ensign Co., 586 P. 2d 
450 (l978), Edgar v. Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 (1977), and others tc 
numerous to cite. This Court rei ter1=;u.-:;µ_ :~,~ ....... .._..._ ____ ... __ ~ ter 
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raised for the first time on appeal, in a recent welfare fraud 
case by stating the following; "We have consistently held that 
matters not raised in the trial court will not be considered on 
appeal!' pepartment of Social Services v. Lester Romero aka 
Ralph G. Romero, slip opinio~, page 2, no. 16551 (filed March 
20, 1980). Thus, this Court should not consider whether or not 
the AFDC regulations deny due process by being vague. 
Even assuming arguendo that this Court considers 
defendant's third point; this Court should still reject the 
argument. In ~reaves v. State of Utah, 528 P.2d 805, 807 (Utah 
1974), the Utah Supreme Court stated the following: 
"the presumption of validity hereinabove stated, 
gives rise to the rule that a statute will not 
be declared unconstitutional for that reason if 
under any sensible interpretation of its language 
it can be given practical effect." 
And in Wagner v. Salt Lake City, 29 Utah 2d 42, 504 P.2d 
1007, 1012 (1972), this Court stated as follows: 
"The fact that the legislature may have been 
more specific in its wording of a statute does 
not render it unconstitutional." 
The above cases show that there is a presumption in favor of 
constitutionality. The AFDC regulation which defines continued 
absence is specific enough to give practical effect to its 
governing statute. It states that one condition for the 
household to be eligible for AFDC is that the parent is out 
of the home. 45 C.F.R. §233.90 (c) (1) (iii). Although, courts 
have at times struggled with what is meant by a parent being out 
of the home, the courts still have been able to apply the 
definition quite uniformly by analyzing all the facts and 
circumstances of each case. 
-15-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the present case, four people that were friends 
of the defendant and who were constantly around the Brigadoon 
Apartments were able to form an opinion that Mary and Pierre 
lived together. (R.118, 119, 135, 144, 157). In fact, Mary 
and Pierre must have been able to understand the meaning of 
living together, or why else would they have made the state-
ment to their neighbors across the hall not to tell the 
welfare man that they were living together. (R. 134, 144). 
In addition, the application forms for AFDC assistance 
are very clear. The forms ask specifically for the applicant to 
list all members of the household. (Appendices Band C) The 
applications also specifically request that the applicant infun 
the APA off ice of any changes in family size or any other 
circumstances which would affect the_ grant amount, (Appendix 
A, last page). 
In the present case, the defendant had been on public 
assistance several times and was well aware of the regulatioM 
affecting her grant. (R. 258-260). She did not list her ex-
· husband on the public assistance forms because she knew that 
it would render her ineligible for AFDC. Thus, this court 
should reject her argument that the AFDC regulations are too 
vague. 
Point IV 
THE STATE SUFFERED ACTUAL DAMAGES WHEN IT 
PAID FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE DEFENDANT 
WHO HAD FRAUDULENTLY INDUCED PAYMENTS 
American Jurisprudence 2d states the following: 
-Hi-
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"The measure of damages for fraud is, as a general rule, the 
actual pecuniary loss sustained." 37 Am Jur. 2d §342 rraud 
and Deceit (1968). Therefore, the measure of damages which 
respondent should have against defendant is $4,080.00 dollars; 
the amount respondent was induced to pay to defendant because 
of her fraudulent misrepresentations. 
Defendant contends that the money she fraudulently 
obtained should be paid back to the State, by the State collecting 
her child support payments. Such reasoning leaves a lot to be 
desired. In other words, defendant wants to benefit from her 
fraud. 
In the first place, defendant would never have been able 
to assign her child support payments, a chose in action, to the 
State if she would have been truthful on her public assistance 
application. The assignment of defendant's support payments 
only came about as a result of defendant's misrepresentations. 
Therefore, since the assignment was induced by fraud, it is 
voided and of no value. 
In this action, the State is recovering from the 
defendant that which the defendant defrauded the State. To 
require the State to recover the defrauded amount from defendant's 
debtors would be a grave injustice to the State and would allow the 
defendant to benefit from her own wrong. Such a ruling should 
be rejected because it would only encourage more welfare fraud. 
Point V 
FOR A HOUSEHOLD TO BE ELIGIBLE FOR AFDC, THERE 
MUST BE A SHOWING OF NEED, AND THERE MUST BE A 
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As was stated in the first point of this brief, 
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) is the governing case for 
AFDC assistance. The holding in King v. Smith is that 
eligibility for AFDC is two pronged. The first prong is 
that the dependent children must be needy. The second prong 
is that not all needy_ children are eligible, but only those 
needy children who are deprvied of parental support. (under 
42 U.S.C.A. § 606(a)). 
Graham v. Shaffer, 17 Ariz. App. 497, 498 P.2d 571 
(1972), also states that a household must show more than need fu 
AFDC.. The following passages explain this point: 
"The Senate Com.rnittee, in its reports preceding 
the enactment of the AFDC program, pointed out that 
the program was not intended to protect all needy 
-children. The report stated that ' many of the 
children included in relief families present no other 
problem than that of providing work for the breadwinner 
of the family." (Citation omitted) Graham, 498 P.2d 573. 
And on page 574, the court adds this comment: 
"Congress did not intend for the family with an 
unemployed 'breadwinner ' to be covered by this specific 
program (AFDC) unless he came under one of the disabili· 
ties mentioned in 42 U.S.C. §606(a)." 
From the above case law it is clear that Congress passed AFDC 
so that families with a parent absent could receive financial 
assistance. If both parents were present in the home and the 
breadwinner was unemployed then the family would need to apply 
for assistance under the AFDC-U program. 
Defenda~t applied for her financial assistance under 
the AFDC program and deliberately withheld information that 
would ultimately render her ineligible. It is not the duty of 
this court to make a determination t .. ~. -· 
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other type of assistance than that for which she applied. 
(See Point I of this brief). Therefore, since Pierre was in the 
home, defendant di~ not meet the two prong test for AFDC 
eligibility. 
Point VI 
THE JUDGMENT OF AWARDING THE STATE ONLY 
$3,066.00 IS NOT CONSI-STENT WITH THE LOWER 
COUR'l'"S FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS INELIGIBLE 
FOR AFDC ASSISTANCE. 
The State's basis for its cross-appeal is that Judge 
Gould's holding which found the defendant ineligible for AFDC 
assistance from August 1976 to May, 1977 is inconsistent with 
the judgment of $3,066.00. The State paid the defendant $4,080.00 
in AFDC assistance during the contested period and this is the 
amount the State should be reimbursed. (R. 56-58). 
The State brought this action against defendant to recover 
only financial assistance. (AFDC benefits). The State agreed 
at trial that the defendant was eligible for food stamp assistance 
during the time in question. (R. 57) . In fact, the defendant 
received food stamp assistance every monthdlring August, 1976 to 
May, 1977. However, part of the financial assistance given to 
the defendant was deducted under the optional Public Assistance 
Withholding program (PAW), to enable the defendant to purchase 
her food stamps. (R. 57, 58) If the defendant had not elected 
to have her food stamps purchased through the PAW program, 
then she would have had to pay in cash, the amount of the PAW 
deduction to receive her food stamps. 
-19-
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At this point, it is important to discuss how food 
stamp assistance is determined and purchased. The amount of 
food stamps allotted to a household is based on the household's 
family size and monthly net adjusted income. Based on the 
adjusted monthly net income the household pays a determined 
amount for the foodstamps received. (Financial assistance 
AFDC benefits is inctuded in the household's adjusted monthly 
net income, See APA Reg., Vol. II §401.15). The difference 
between the amount of foodstamps received and the amount paid 
is the bonus, or the foodstamp assistance. 
As stated before, this bonus or food stamp assistance 
the defendant received is not contested. What is contested is 
lower court's ruling of including the PAW deduction as part 
of the food stamp assistance. The PAW is an optional program 
which is used by welfare recipients who are receiving money 
from more than one welfare program. For example: if a person 
with a household of 5 and no outside income was receiving $408J 
in AFDC, and was also eligible for food stamp assistance that 
·person would have the following two options available. The 
applicant could either receive the $408.00 in financial assisW 
and then pay a portion of .that financial assistance to receive 
her food stamp allotment (applicant pays $110.00 to receive 
$189.00 in food stamps, result a bonus of $79.00) or she could 
have a portion of her financial assistance grant deducted under 
PAW and the deducted amount would be used to purchase her 
food stamps (Deduct $110.00 to received $189.00 in food stamps 
result a bonus of $79.ooiunder either option the applicant 
-20-
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receives the same in AFDC aid and food stamp assistance. Therefore, 
the bonus is food stamp assistance but the PAW deduction is not. 
The PAW program was instituted so that welfare recipients 
could avoid the inconvenience of having to bring their welfare 
money in to purchase food st~rnps. PAW was not set up to be a 
supplement, for food stamp assistance. If defendant had been 
ineligible for AFDC, she would have purchased food stamps out 
of her own money, or if she would have had no money she would 
have received a bonus amount of food stamps. Since defendant 
was not eligible for AFDC, due to her fraudulent_ misrepresentation, 
her AFDC benefits of $408.00 was included in her monthly adjusted 
net income. See APA Reg., Vol II 401.15. Defendant's election 
to use the PAW program made it easier for her to receive all her 
welfare benefits. The election did not increase the amount of her 
food stamp bonus. Thus, the State should be awarded the $4,080.00 
in AFDC benefits which defendant fraudulently obtained. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant misrepresented on her public. assistance 
application forms essental information used to determine her 
eligibility for AFDC. As ,a result of her misrepresentations, 
defendant obtained $4,080.00 in AFDC which she was not entitled 
to receive. A great injustice would occur to the State if 
defendant, who perpetrated her fraud, is allowed to retain any of 
these funds. 
The State at the trial level proved by clear and 
convincing evidence that defendant's ex-husband was in the home. 
The unreported presence of defendant's ex-husband in the home, 
-21-
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was sufficient by itself, to render defendant's household 
ineligible for AFDC. Therefore, any evidence regarding Pierre': 
support of his children is irrelevant to the case at bar. 
Defendant's contention attacking the APA regulations 
on vagueness grounds should also be rejected. This argument is 
raised for the first time on appeal, and even if it wasn't 
defendant understood the regulations in as much as she specifi-
cally requested two of her neighbors not to tell the welfare 
man that she and Pierre lived together. 
The State in this case suffered actual damages of 
$4,089.00 and should not be required to collect this money 
from defendant's debtors. The State should be allowed to 
recover the $4,080.00 from the one who committed the fraud. 
In addition, the defendant should not benefit, from the lower 
court's misunderstanding of the PAW program. This program 
is not a supplement for foodstamp assistance, but is just an 
efficient way of accounting for all of one's welfare needs. 
Since defendant was ineligible for AFDC and was not 
entitled to receive anything from the program, the State should 
be awarded $4,080.00 the amount obtained by the defendant due to 
her fraud. Thus, the respondent urges this court to affirm 
the lower court's finding that defendant committed fraud in 
obtaining AFDC assistance. The respondent also requests this 
court to reverse the lower court's judgment of $3,066.00 and 
-22-
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in its place grant the State judgment for $4,080.00. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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